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Chapter 8 – Beyond authors’ rights 
 
The Royal Commission Report 
Owen retreated to his home at the end of March 1933 to write the 
Royal Commission report. The Government published the report at the 
end of May 1933. With typical industry, Owen assimilated the complex 
testimony of 60 witnesses, and the subtle, conflicting arguments of 
counsel, to prepare a comprehensive survey of the disputes over 
performing rights. In writing the report, he performed his last act of 
public service. He died at home of cancer in January 1935.  
The Royal Commissioner made 15 recommendations.1 The first 
proposed the creation of a copyright tribunal to determine licensing 
conditions, and the majority of the following recommendations 
proposed the imposition on APRA of reporting and other obligations. 
The report recommended that Parliament determine whether record 
companies could lawfully claim the performing right and consider 
whether at the next Berne Convention Conference (scheduled for 
Brussels in 1935), Australia should lobby for legislatures to receive the 
explicit right to regulate performing right societies. 
Owen dealt with his subject matter thematically. The first part of the 
report examined the history of APRA, the legality of the performing 
right and the issues surrounding APRA’s assertion and enforcement of 
the right. The second discussed in turn the concerns and proposals of 
each of the major users of commercial music. The third examined the 
radio ban, the claim for the mechanical performing right, and the 
arguments for invoking patents legislation to prohibit the supply of 
records. The report also considered the arguments for the institution of 
a tribunal, treaty considerations, the legislative powers of Parliament 
and the interests of the public. 
APRA and the performing right 
At the beginning of the report Owen asserted the legitimacy of the 
musical performing right. Musical performing rights, he wrote, were 
recognised in British law long prior to the 1911 Act and both the 1905 
                                                     
1 See appendix 2. 
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and 1912 Australian Acts recognised the right. Courts recognised the 
necessity for the existence of a body like APRA to safeguard the 
interests of musical authors. APRA, a monopoly, wielded immense 
power but the Commission heard no evidence to suggest that it claims 
were extortionate. 
According to Owen, APRA “carries on its business on sound lines, is 
managed by capable and reasonable men, protects to the best of its 
ability the interests of the copyright owners it represents, accounts, as 
best it can, to those whose money it collects, and attempts to afford 
information to those who use or seek the music it claims to control.” 
The Royal Commissioner recognised that its monopoly over the 
performing right in music gave it power that could be abused. APRA, 
said Owen, “can write its own terms … and, unless the law be altered 
there can be no restraint upon its demands.” The “user in public and 
the community itself” were dependent on its goodwill. “It cannot be 
said,” wrote Owen, “that the demands made hitherto have been 
extortionate, but they can be made so.” A tribunal would provide music 
users with redress against the misuse of APRA’s power.  
But as Owen carefully pointed out, while the tribunal would determine 
fees and other licensing conditions, his readers should not draw the 
conclusion that APRA’s levies were too high. The Commissioner 
disagreed with views expressed six years earlier in the report of the 
Royal Commission on Wireless. In 1927, the royal commissioners 
concluded that APRA’s fees were out of proportion to “the service 
rendered or value given” by the collecting society.  
Owen acknowledged their views but tactfully suggested that the earlier 
commissioners were not adequately informed about the behaviour of 
APRA. They received, he explained, “evidence that was far less 
complete than has been placed before the present Commission.” Owen 
politely ignored their criticism APRA.  
He acknowledged, however, that the users of music all expressed 
“strong feeling” that APRA appeared to operate for the benefit of 
publishers not the authors to whom most users agreed licence fees 
collected should be disbursed. He recognised the inadequacies of 
APRA’s reporting: 
The balance fees prepared annually by the Australasian Performing Right 
Association are not available to users of music, do not furnish details of the 
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distribution of fees collected, and afford no information as to how publisher members 
allocate the fees coming to them. 
The report said that to bolster public confidence, APRA should be 
required to file annual accounts setting out details of fees received and 
distributed and furnish a list of members. Additionally, APRA should 
supply complete lists of its repertoire or, if this was not possible, lists of 
the works it wished to protect. 
Broadcasters 
Owen’s report extolled the public benefits of radio broadcasting and 
asked a simple question: 
Should not the rights of authors, composers and publishers be harmonized with the 
general interests of the State, to which individual interests should particularly  
submit themselves? 
He declared his sympathy for radio stations facing rising imposts from 
APRA and constriction in the supply of records. Too much 
broadcasting of records “must prejudice sales” but conditions 
“imposing constant announcement of the make, titles etc of records” 
were “unfair”. Broadcasters were at APRA’s mercy. If, as claimed, 
broadcasting caused falling sales of sheet music and records, APRA 
could remedy income deficits by increasing its levies.  
Whatever the effect of broadcasting on sales, licensing revenues were 
safe. In Owen’s opinion, while broadcasting did contribute to the 
falling sale of records, the Great Depression contributed most directly 
to the downturn in sales. 
The Royal Commissioner also dismissed APRA’s attempt to discredit 
the ABC’s complaint about the disparity between fees paid by the 
national broadcaster compared with those paid by the B Class stations. 
The ABC argued that it should not be charged fees higher than those 
paid by the commercial stations. APRA responded by asserting that the 
rates paid by the commercial stations were too low. According to 
APRA the lower rate should be raised, not the reverse. Owen 
disagreed. He wrote: 
The Australian Broadcasting Commission not unfairly points out, not that the 
charge of from 3d to ½ d per item levied on the ‘B’ Class stations is too low, but 
that the proposed charge to the National stations is far too high. 
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Owen emphasised that the B Class stations deserved consideration. 
They could not be classified, like the ABC, as a public utility but they 
performed a valuable function in disseminating the benefits of 
broadcasting, including the playing of music, to all parts of Australia: 
The “B” Class stations meet a public demand which at present and for some years 
the National stations cannot fill. They bring within the reach of listeners valuable 
and interesting information, speeches, lectures and addresses on matters of public 
importance, and classical music of value from an educational point of view. It is true 
they operate in order to make a profit, but none the less stations render a useful 
public service.  
The record companies 
Turning to the associated manufacturers, Owen concentrated on the 
radio ban, specifically the claimed cause of the ban – the fall in record 
sales – and dealt only briefly with his greater concern, the claim for the 
mechanical performing right. Surprisingly, he devoted only a page to 
topics that occupied a considerable amount of the Royal Commission’s 
time, and, as revealed by transcripts, undoubtedly caused the 
Commissioner anxiety, which he confessed to Keating.  
The report acknowledged that in 1927–1931, the record companies 
suffered “a remarkable falling off in sales”. In those four years, the 
principal distributor for the manufacturers, Hoffnung and Company, 
posted a drop in sales of almost 80 per cent. “The real question,” wrote 
Owen, “is to what cause or causes should this be attributed.” He 
considered economic depression to be the main reason for the sales 
catastrophe. Though the record companies argued that continuous 
playing of new releases discouraged listeners from buying records, in 
the years before the Depression they viewed broadcasting “as a means 
of advertising their records over the air”. When the effects of economic 
depression ceased to distort sales figures, it might be seen, wrote Owen, 
that music broadcasting boosted demand for records.  
As he pointed out, if the record companies were correct about the 
effect of broadcasting, the radio ban should have helped them to 
rapidly recover their economic position. The companies, though, would 
not provide sales figure for the first 12 months of the ban, saying they 
needed a longer period to accurately assess its effectiveness.  
The Commissioner disagreed, implying his suspicion that the ban 
reflected a simple, misguided, desire to stamp out a rival for the 
attention of music listeners.  
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Even under current conditions, wrote Owen, radio broadcasting gave 
“much and valuable advertisement” to records, though stations ought 
to be careful not to overplay hits. Additionally, they ought to broadcast 
some details of songs played, including the title of the song and the 
name of the company that produced the song recording. The report 
suggested that the associated manufacturers were mistaken to view the 
broadcasters as economic rivals. But creating commercial peace 
between the two posed an “apparently insuperable difficulty”.  
Owen’s sympathies, not overtly expressed, undoubtedly lay with the 
commercial radio stations. He discussed the associated manufacturers’ 
control over the production and supply of records in Australia, 
indicating that they functioned as a monopoly, but he stopped short of 
stating that they intended the radio ban to drive perceived competitors 
out of business.  
The Report referred ambiguously to the possibility of “legislative 
action” to end the radio ban, but Owen concluded that a commercial 
dispute over supply did not warrant the Commission recommending 
such action. Only if “the public at large” called for legislation should 
the Government respond. 
Owen did not equivocate on the subject of the claimed mechanical 
performing right. The report noted that the common law did not 
support the adducing of such a right. It was “by no means clear” that 
the British legislature in 1911 intended to create the claimed right. And 
the idea of the manufacturer’s performing right in a record raised 
philosophic and practical difficulties.  
In the first place, it seemed self-evident that the playing of a record 
involved a single acoustic performance, which implied the existence of 
a single performing right that must properly vest in the creator of the 
music heard – not “the maker of mechanical contrivance” that 
functioned to allow the music to be heard. Secondly, if the 
manufacturers’ performing right were recognised, users would be asked 
to accept conditions, and pay fees, to use two separate rights. The 
effect on commerce would be “extraordinary”. 
The Tribunal 
Having outlined the differences between the suppliers and users of 
commercial music, and their individual characteristics and concerns, 
Owen turned to the real purpose of holding the Royal Commission: 
identifying appropriate measures to bring harmony to the relations 
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between the users and suppliers of copyright music. For the 
Commissioner, the most necessary step required the legislature to 
create an arbitral tribunal. As he wrote in the report, the “claim that 
some form of tribunal should be constituted finally to determine 
disputes is supported by every class of user and is based on clearly 
established facts.” 
While the suppliers of music argued that “interference by a tribunal is 
an invasion of the right of contract”, the public performance of music 
was a public good, and the needs of the public must be preferred to the 
preferences of APRA and the record companies. The report said that, 
“the question is whether the interests of those who control most of the 
music should not be made to give way, to an extent at any rate, to the 
good of the people.” 
Owen also advised that a tribunal or some form of compulsory 
arbitration was necessary to resolve the dispute between the associated 
manufacturers and the radio stations – it was “contrary to the interest 
of the public that these disputes should exist or should continue.” In 
support of the idea of a tribunal, he pointed out that in the United 
Kingdom the Music Users’ Association had pressed for some form of 
tribunal while the users also strongly urged a Select Committee of the 
House of Commons to recommend the creation of a tribunal.  
In Italy, an Arbitration Commission determined copyright disputes, 
while in Norway the Minister could authorise the broadcasting of 
works and fix rates of remuneration to authors. In the United States, 
radio stations intended to ask federal authorities to either dissolve the 
American Performing Right Association for monopoly practice or to 
create a copyright tribunal. The Australian tribunal, if created, should 
not be made in the image of Federal or State Arbitration Courts.  
As Owen observed, a tribunal constituted like a court would display the 
disadvantages of a permanent court – delay, expense and the fostering 
of a spirit of litigation. The copyright tribunal should adopt simple and 
inexpensive methods and procedures and need only be convened by 
application to the Minister. The Minister would then simply refer the 
dispute for determination or arbitration by a competent person. 
The report indicated that if the system envisaged by Owen were 
implemented, an arbitrator would constitute the tribunal to hear 
disputes as necessary. In complex matters, the single arbitrator  
might be joined by others. Owen suggested the appointment of a senior 
judicial officer to the post of arbitrator and explicitly rejected  
 
227 
proposals for the appointment of one of the presidents of the State 
chartered accountancy institutes, or the Solicitor General or the 
Registrar of Copyrights. 
“Miscellaneous users of music” 
Miscellaneous users of music referred to in the Report included the 
Australian Steamship Owners’ Federation, catering industries, 
cinematograph exhibitors, municipal and shire associations, retail 
traders and religious and charitable bodies. Owen considered the 
argument of shipping companies that live or gramophone music played 
on ships was not-for-profit to be “unsound” but commented no 
further. He expressed sympathy for the argument of hotels, cafes and 
boarding houses that none played music on their premises for profit, 
but again offered no definite comment.  
On the other hand, he endorsed the proposals of the cinematograph 
exhibitors who asked for the establishment of a tribunal to determine 
licensing conditions and the introduction of a requirement for APRA 
to file lists of charge, to be reviewed, when necessary, by the Minister. 
The municipal organisations presented arguments that evidently caused 
Owen difficulty, and he chose to summarise their contentions without 
himself drawing conclusions. The associations claimed that music 
played in public halls promoted interest in music, and performances 
usually occurred during no-fee or charitable events. The associations, 
however, showed no inclination to pay fees at all. Only about 20 halls 
throughout Australia paid APRA copyright fees. The rest did not 
dispute APRA’s levies on the grounds that they were too high but that 
they should not be made at all.  
Turning to the complaints of retail trade associations of various States, 
Owen again made no findings. He recited the associations’ complaints: 
they did not argue that APRA’s fees were too high but rather that they 
could not understand the basis on which fees were determined and they 
could not prevent APRA from capriciously increasing charges at any 
time. Additionally, their members could supply APRA with returns of 
music performed giving details of titles, authors and composers etc. 
APRA reserved the right to charge licence fees for the performance of 
music in churches and the premises of other religious venues or 
charities. Usually, it waived fees but it did charge broadcasters for the 
broadcasting of religious services. APRA’s claim for fees in these 
instances, said Owen, was “unreasonable”. In a number of instances 
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APRA had acted “hastily and without reasonable consideration for the 
difficulties of some users of music”. The report implied, but did not 
state, that APRA should refrain from collecting copyright fees from 
religious or charitable bodies.  
Conclusions 
After extensively discussing the claims of the suppliers and users of 
commercial music, and the environment in which they negotiated terms 
of use, Owen summarised his findings. APRA he called a “super-
monopoly” and the associated manufacturers an effective monopoly. 
Individually or together they could exert their market power to 
interrupt or wholly stop the supply of commercial music to the public. 
Both could grievously harm the commercial users of copyright music, 
in particular, the broadcasters. The establishment of a copyright 
tribunal would help to prevent either collective from abusing its 
monopoly power, and ensure that the controllers of music supplied 
music to users on reasonable terms. 
Owen declined to report on the reasonableness of the charges and 
licensing conditions imposed by APRA or the merits of the radio ban. 
But he did make certain adverse findings. APRA’s charges to the ABC 
were “excessive” and the ABC’s offer to pay 6 per cent of revenue in 
licence fees was “reasonably fair”. APRA’s rates charged to the B Class 
stations for 1932 were “reasonably fair”. Charges to picture theatres 
were “excessive” and obligations concerning the making of distribution 
returns required modification.  
Charges to other users, such as ship owners, hotels, restaurants and 
cafes were “not calculated on any reasonably settled basis” and 
complaints were justified. The associated manufacturers should offer to 
the B Class stations the same terms for the supply of records as those 
offered to the ABC. Finally, the terms of agreements or licences for the 
use of records or musical works should be from two to three years. 
Owen explained that public necessity prompted his call for legislation 
to end the copyright wars. If disputes between the controllers and users 
of music were private in scope, Parliament would have no obvious 
motives to intervene. But the copyright disputes investigated by the 
Royal Commission caused people at large detriment. The need to 
protect the public justified legislative intervention. 
Owen acknowledged the common perception that copyright owners 
were insatiable and demanded revenue from all conceivable sources. As 
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he pointed out, broadcasting and the gramophone hugely increased the 
numbers able to hear public performances of music, and the owners 
and suppliers of copyright music demanded remuneration from all the 
public disseminators of music. Relay broadcasting, the rediffusion of 
music by speakers, the use of records for broadcasting, the playing of 
music at religious services or for charitable services – all were the 
subject of claims for payment. 
The report emphasised that while authors, composers and publishers 
were “entitled to every consideration” their interest must “be 
reconciled with those of the listening public.” Owen pointedly omitted 
to refer to the record companies when listing the interests deserving 
“every consideration”. His recommendations reflected both his, and 
Keating’s, principled attitude towards legal reform. Neither could step 
outside the narrow parameters of their inquiry – they could not, even if 
they wished to, disparage the performing right – but they could, and 
did, propose an adjudicative solution to the problems posed by APRA’s 
monopoly power.  
The proposed solution anticipated the establishment of today’s 
Copyright Tribunal, the imperfect bequest, in an abstract sense, of 
copyright users demanding checks on APRA’s power. Owen, a stickler 
for ethical commercial practice, followed Keating’s recommendation 
and proposed that APRA be compelled to report on income and 
distributions. To the frustration of aggrieved licensees confronted with 
APRA’s payment demands (and later those of other collecting 
societies), the Australian legislature never implemented this proposal.  
In the end, Owen’s report reflected a conventional respect for authors’ 
rights and a pragmatic search for ways to moderate, in the public 
interest, the exercise of absolute entitlements. The limited discussion of 
the record companies’ claim for a mechanical performance right, and 
the disavowal of that claim, reveal Owen not as a visionary but rather a 
man of his time – a time about to be extinguished by the era of 
copyright industries demanding and receiving the suite of analogous 
rights that placed them on an equal footing with authors. 
The Government’s response 
The Government printed the Royal Commission’s report at the end of 
May 1933, and waited until the beginning of the Spring session in 
August before releasing it to Parliament. While most observers reacted 
mutely to the report, APRA orchestrated a firestorm of protest from 
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foreign performing right societies and various famous composers. How 
much their protest influenced the Government’s response to the report 
is hard to judge. John Latham, the Minister most likely to shape that 
response, would soon retire from politics, and seemed disengaged from 
his portfolio. 
Now 56 years old, a major figure in federal politics for the last decade, 
the Attorney General harboured no illusions about his future in 
Canberra. The Prime Minister, Joe Lyons, a skilful and adaptable leader, 
would win another two terms of office and always proved more adept 
than his deputy at uniting the disparate factions of the UAP. Latham, 
who stood aside at the inception of the UAP to let Lyons lead the new 
party, accepted that he would never replace Lyons, two years his junior, 
as Prime Minister.  
When APRA began campaigning to discredit the findings of the Royal 
Commission, Latham knew that Lyons would appoint him Chief Justice 
of the High Court after the imminent retirement of the ancient Sir 
Frank Gavan Duffy, then 81 years of age. What he thought of Owen’s 
report is hard to tell. He seems not have thought much about copyright 
questions after his initial burst of energy in 1932. Hoping, perhaps, to 
be remembered as the lucid and uncompromising practitioner of 
principle in politics, he probably felt averse to steering the Government 
into a noisy public quarrel with APRA. 
At any rate, Latham decided against recommending that Cabinet accept 
Owen’s recommendations. The Government implemented only one of 
the 15 legislative amendments proposed by the Royal Commission to 
regulate the exercise of performing rights in Australia. 
Recommendation 8 of the report proposed legislation to provide “a 
remedy in case of groundless threats of legal proceedings” by APRA 
and in 1935 Parliament passed implementing legislation.  
Voluntary arbitration 
Latham did not give way to APRA entirely. After publication of the 
Commission’s Report, he instructed his department to prepare an 
amending bill to permit the voluntary arbitration of performing rights. 
But why Latham considered the amending legislation, passed in 
December 1933, would have any positive effect, is mysterious.  
The new provision in the Copyright Act did not confer a substantively 
new legal entitlement, though it allowed the parties to regard the  
referee of their squabble as a simulacrum of government authority. 
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Section 13A provided that disputants could apply to the Attorney 
General “for the determination of their quarrel by voluntary arbitration 
by an arbitrator mutually selected, or, failing such selection, by the 
Governor General”. 
Not surprisingly, everyone involved in the arguments over the 
performing rights greeted the legislation with indifference. A quarter of 
a century after its enactment, the Spicer Committee, reviewing the 
copyright law, reported that section 13A remained unused. For over 30 
years it lived quietly in the lowlands of the Copyright Act, probably the 
most pointless ordinance passed in Latham’s long career as the 
Commonwealth’s first law officer. 
A reason for Latham endorsing so meaningless an enactment is not 
hard to guess. He perhaps no longer had the stomach for the 
intricacies, and the rough and tumble, of the war over performing 
rights. Section 13A achieved nothing practical but the provision gave 
the appearance of responding to the Royal Commission’s principal 
recommendation, and caused no offence to APRA. Latham could even 
believe, if he chose, that the amendment in some way implemented a 
legislative solution he had supported since the 1920s. 
In his first period as Attorney, Latham advocated in private the 
necessity for the compulsory arbitration of performing right disputes. 
Only by this measure, he thought, could parties with no negotiating 
power – the users of music – hope to deal on more equal terms with a 
leviathan like APRA. When, in 1927, the Picture Showmen’s 
Association suggested that the Government pass legislation to allow for 
compulsory arbitration, he told his department to prepare a draft 
arbitration bill. Latham may have considered asking Cabinet to approve 
the bill for introduction to Parliament, but if he did so, he ran out of 
time. His party lost office in 1929, and when he resumed his post as 
Attorney in 1932, he decided on a wide-ranging inquiry into the 
performing right – the Royal Commission.  
For Latham in 1933, the Commission’s report proposing wide-ranging 
copyright legislation, and a furious APRA, probably seemed like twin 
serpents weaving circles on the path ahead. By securing the 
introduction of section 13A, the Attorney neatly avoided both. A 
provision allowing for government-sanctioned voluntary arbitration 
suggested Government responsiveness while allowing Latham to 
quietly wind up his long involvement in copyright policy-making.  
Since the legislation offended no-one, and since the Government’s 
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indifference to Owen’s recommendations suited APRA and the record 
manufacturers, no-one protested as the Royal Commission report 
disappeared into the maw of history. 
The formal Government response and Owen’s views  
In October 1933, Latham told Parliament that the Government did not 
intend to implement the Royal Commission’s legislative proposals. The 
Commission’s recommendations raised difficult legal and practical 
questions and he hope to achieve solutions by encouraging agreement 
between the parties. Negotiated outcomes to resolve disputes, he said, 
were preferable to legislation. The Attorney received support from an 
unexpected quarter. Shortly after Latham’s announcement to 
Parliament, Owen wrote to him concurring with the need to resolve 
differences by negotiation.  
According to Owen, “only obstinacy and an absence of sweet 
reasonableness seemed to keep the parties apart.” He told Latham that 
in his report, he “intended to convey … that legislation should be 
resorted to only if agreement was found to be impossible.” The rights 
of copyright owners, he said, including the record companies, “should 
only be interfered with or curtailed if, failing agreement, the public 
interest demanded legislative action.” For Owen, “it was obvious that 
on most of the important issues, agreement between the two parties 
was not only desirable but possible.”  
Thus the resolution for which Latham laboured with intelligence and 
determination from the early days of his first term as Attorney General 
never materialised. In the last days of his office it lay within his power 
to propose a settlement that anticipated some changes introduced in 
the new Copyright Act of 1968, most notably the introduction of the 
Copyright Tribunal. He might even have overseen the introduction of 
revolutionary legislation that required APRA to report publicly on 
income distributions. Less dramatically, he could have secured 
amendments that made the rediffusion of broadcasts non-remunerable.  
But Latham knew that if the Government implemented Owen’s 
recommendations, the way ahead would be fraught with danger and 
difficulty. APRA and the record companies, giants opposed to 
legislative action, stood in the way. And it was by no means clear, to 
judge from the conflicting noises of legal experts, that the 
Commonwealth could amend the copyright legislation to restrict the 
operation of the performing right and permit compulsory arbitration.  
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Latham, his gaze now fixed on new fields of endeavour, evidently saw 
no benefit in steering the Government down the path of reform. For 
another 12 months he settled his political affairs, resigning before the 
next General Election in October 1934, and handing his seat and 
ministry to a forceful newcomer – Robert Menzies. Latham began his 
new duties as Chief Justice of the High Court in February 1935.  
Latham’s legacy 
Latham left a mixed legacy. Intellectually, few, if any, of his 
predecessors or successors equalled him. None managed the copyright 
law regulatory process with the same sustained attention for so long a 
period. None understood so clearly the constraints and necessities that 
simultaneously inhibited and motivated Commonwealth policy makers 
entrusted with the task of copyright law reform.  
But unlike some others, Latham failed to grasp the nettle. He decided 
in the 1920s that the best way to end the APRA wars was to legislate to 
allow the compulsory arbitration of copyright disputes, and his 
department prepared draft arbitration legislation. In the 1930s, 
however, he decided not to support the Owen Royal Commission’s 
central recommendation, that the Government create a copyright 
tribunal to determine quarrels over performing rights.  
From the early days of APRA’s battles with music users, Latham knew 
that users demanded that APRA publicly disclose details of its income 
distributions. Yet he declined to support Owen’s proposal for the 
Government to compel such disclosure. He harboured no illusions 
about APRA’s intentions, but when he departed office commercial 
music users, the ABC especially, were no better positioned in their 
negotiations with APRA than 10 years before.  
Latham chose to share Owen’s illusion that the controllers and users of 
commercial music were a mere step away from resolving, in an 
equitable way, their differences over fees and the conditions of music 
licensing. To accept the illusion meant ignoring the reality that APRA 
(by unequivocal legal right) and the record companies (by asserted legal 
right) controlled the performance of music without limitation. Allowing 
for boundaries of pragmatism or necessity, they could dictate the 
licence terms accepted by users. 
In part, Latham’s response to the recommendations of the Royal 
Commission’s reflected his temperament. In politics, the man described 
by the press as “the disembodied brain” and “the last proud scion in a 
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long line of pokers”, easily discerned principles of action and the 
necessities of policy. But he was a thinker not a finisher. Though he 
reformed the arbitration laws in the late 1920s, his application of the 
legislation contributed to an industrial relations quagmire that ended in 
the defeat of his Government. 
Latham disliked in principle the idea of government interposing 
between parties striking a bargain. As his use of the arbitration 
provisions to harass unions showed, the problems caused by inequality 
of bargaining power occupied his mind far less than those resulting 
from unlawful or unsavoury behaviour. More importantly, though, 
Latham abandoned the cause of copyright law reform, a cause he took 
seriously, because time ran out. Committed to a new career, he wanted 
to spend his last year in office tying the loose ends of policy not 
corralling the dogs of copyright war.  
His unwillingness to make a final effort to resolve performing rights 
issues can only be seen, in hindsight, as an abnegation of responsibility. 
Latham left all users of commercial music, but the broadcasters 
especially, in the lurch. He left his colleague, the Postmaster General, to 
struggle on unaided with broadcasting regulation. For the rest of the 
decade, successive Postmasters General fought the APRA dragon, 
trying to ensure that public performance fees did not wreak havoc on 
an industry still trying to find financial stability. Their shared  
bitterness against APRA spilled over in a stormy parliamentary debate 
in 1939. But they might also have criticised – and in private perhaps did 
– the quiescence of Latham in 1933. Latham, the advocate of free 
enterprise, the scourge of unions, proved maladroit at combating the 
evils of monopoly. 
Latham, it seems, simply closed his eyes to the difficulties ahead, and 
the likelihood that his inaction would amplify those difficulties. He 
perhaps told himself that the Owen Report highlighted the issues 
confronting copyright policy makers and suggested a path of reform. 
He chose not to follow that path but he knew that his successors  
could profitably consult Owen’s findings in the future. In the 
meantime, he possibly reassured himself with the thought that the 
suppliers and users of copyright music knew much more about each 
other than before, and could be expected to agree to a semblance of 
peace in the copyright world. 
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Recognition of the mechanical performing right 
Months before Latham left Canberra, he learnt that the Chancery 
Division of the High Court in London had recognised the existence of 
a mechanical performing right. In Gramophone Company Limited v Stephen 
Cawardine and Company, 2 a case heard in December 1933, but decided 
the following year, Justice Maugham ruled that the owners of copyright 
in records were entitled to control public performances of the records.  
Maugham judgment limited the record owner’s performing right in one 
important way. He asserted that record owner’s performance right must 
be “subordinate” to the “original” copyright of the owner of the 
copyright in works. Accordingly, if the owner of the subordinate 
copyright permitted the playing of a record in public, the owner of 
original copyright could prohibit the performance. Subject to this 
limitation, however, the owner of copyright in records could license for 
profit the playing of records in public. 
Maugham’s decision doubtless stunned Australian watchers, though the 
official records disclose little about the reactions of bureaucrats or 
politicians. Latham may perhaps have been fleetingly interested. Owen, 
who greatly feared the consequences of users having to pay to exercise 
two performing rights, would certainly have felt disappointed. Keating, 
not so worried about the prospect of two payments, probably read the 
decision with growing bemusement. The record manufacturers, as they 
digested the implications of the case, were surely jubilant. The decision, 
though not binding in Australia, lent persuasive support to their 
argument for the mechanical performing right, and validated their legal 
justification for the radio ban. 
From the modern perspective, the judgment is important chiefly for 
another reason. It signifies something like the first breathless entry  
of new kings into the inner sanctum of the copyright temple: here,  
they pick up the stone idols dedicated to authors’ rights and  
smash them against the wall. Soon, no-one dared to doubt the claim  
of the recording, film and broadcasting industries to be treated by  
the polity with the same consideration, and perhaps more, than that 
shown authors. 
 
                                                     
2 1 Ch 451 [1934]. 
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Influence of Justice Maugham 
The result in Cawardine vindicated the arguments of John Drummond 
Robertson in the London copyright debates of 1909 and 1911. Another 
judge may have responded to the submissions differently. In Frederick 
Maugham, the proponents of mechanical rights found, fortuitously, a 
judge who made his mind up in original ways. In him they happily 
discovered a cussed rationalist – a little like Latham – who mixed 
detachment with a few strong aversions. 
For the creative vocation he felt none of the sentiment overflowing in 
the delegates of the Berne Union. The literary success of his brother 
Somerset Maugham annoyed him greatly. Frederick’s only son Robin, 
whom he considered a wastrel, became a writer, and benefited from 
Somerset’s tutelage. Frederick disliked his brother and son and they 
warmly reciprocated his feelings. Robin, in a book of reflections on his 
uncle, said that Somerset Maugham felt certain he would make a much 
better judge than his brother, while Frederick never wavered from the 
belief that he possessed the greater literary talent.3 
When he came to decide the case, Justice Maugham is unlikely to have 
felt any trace of kindness towards authors. Stripped of sentimental 
vagaries about the vocation of writers, arguments for authors’ rights 
sometimes appear threadbare, and Maugham applied cold logic to 
determine that effort and investment can properly be accorded 
copyright protection as readily as creative endeavour.  
It would be a mistake to assume that his aversion to his literary 
relatives, or his disdain for their choice of career, caused him to favour 
the gramophone industry. The Gramophone Company hired as its 
chief barrister Sir Stafford Cripps, an upper class socialist Labour MP 
and politically Maugham’s antithesis. Maugham, later a Conservative 
Lord Chancellor, appointed first a hereditary, then a life, peer, probably 
regarded Cripps as a quisling who betrayed his caste to espouse class 
warfare.4 He may have felt a degree of animus towards Cripps similar 
to that he displayed to his brother and son. But like Latham, he looked 
                                                     
3 Robin Maugham, Somerset and all the Maughams, 1966. 
4 A highly successful barrister from a rich family, Cripps joined the Labour Party in 
1930 and became Solicitor General the following year. An evangelical Christian and 
doctrinaire Marxist (except in religious matters) he helped found the Socialist 
League in 1932. He became Chancellor of the Exchequer in the Labour 
Government in 1947 and retired from politics in 1950. He died in 1952 aged 62. 
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with detachment at the evidence, and regarded with equal frostiness the 
human beings arguing before him. 
The arguments in Cawardine 
The Gramophone Company brought Cawardine as a test case to 
determine the scope of its rights under section 19, the compulsory 
licensing provision of the British Copyright Act. Cawardine, the 
defendant company, played records made by the Gramophone 
Company in its tea and coffee rooms. The plaintiff asked a simple 
question. Could it obtain an injunction to restrain the defendant from 
infringing its copyright in records by playing those records in public? 
Cripps presented an uncomplicated argument. Under section 19, the 
Gramophone Company owned copyright in the records. The copyright 
in a record comprised the elements of copyright set out in section 1 of 
the Act. The owner could therefore prevent third parties from playing 
the record in public without consent. Cawardine’s counsel argued that 
the “rights” of copyright enumerated in section 1 were ‘sole’ rights that 
vested solely in the owner of copyright in works. Only the owner of the 
embodied works could prevent the playing of a record in public. The 
argument for a “performance” right in a record involved a “complete 
contradiction in terms.” 
Maugham resolved the conflicting arguments adeptly by accepting the 
fundamental propositions of both sides. Yes, he agreed, the copyright 
of the owners of works took precedence over that of the makers of 
recordings. But the superiority of their copyright did not prevent the 
makers of records from asserting a public performance right. The right 
remained subordinate to the original copyright subsisting in works. 
According to Maugham original and subordinate, or special, copyright 
co-existed. The sole rights of copyright in section 1 vested in the 
original owner of copyright, but the owner of subordinate copyright 
could, so long as the copyrights did not conflict, control the playing of 
records in public. He said: 
Therefore in my opinion the original owner has under s.1 of the Act the sole right or 
performing the work in public, and this includes the sole right of performing the 
work by any mechanical means, and the existence of what I have termed special 
copyright under s. 19 does not derogate from this right of the original owner. If the 
contrary had been intended I should certainly have expected clear words in s. 19 to 
that effect, and they are not to be found. 
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Maugham indulged in the judicial vice of inventing legislative intent to 
support his suppositions. When the legislators in 1911 approved 
section 19, they made themselves clear on only one point: the necessity  
for compulsory licensing to avoid monopoly conduct by authors.  
They did not clarify why they created a manufacturer’s copyright or 
make clear the intended scope of the copyright. Nor did they say 
anything that justified the inference that they intended to create a 
subordinate copyright.  
New insight 
Maugham produced a sleight of hand and a compelling one. The 
pragmatic temptation is to agree that positive rights can fairly be 
deduced from lacunae in legislation and the silence of the legislature. 
But nothing in the Act positively indicated that the subordinate right to 
control the reproduction of records made under compulsory licence 
included a subordinate right of public performance. 
Judicial inventiveness may sometimes be necessary to make sense of 
legislation, and though Maugham made unjustified inferences about 
Parliament’s intent, his expedient fictions about original and 
subordinate copyright offered new insight into the function of 
copyright. What is most interesting about his judgment, though, is that 
he stated, as if channelling the spirit of Drummond Robertson, a purely 
utilitarian view of the basis for copyright. 
He described the finding of a mechanical performing right as a matter 
of fairness: 
It is, in my opinion, a reasonable construction that the owner of a special copyright 
under s. 19 in a record of which he is the owner has the sole right to use that record 
for a performance in public, provided that the overriding rights of the original owner 
do not intervene … I see no fairness or injustice that is likely to arise from my 
construction of the section. On the other hand, I can see considerable objection from 
that standpoint, to the view that persons may obtain, without doing anything more 
than buying a record, the advantage of the work, skill and labour expended by the 
makers of gramophone records for the purposes of a public performance. 
 
Earlier, Maugham referred to the “skill, both of a technical and a 
musical kind” needed in making records. He emphasised also that to 
make records, companies need to invest considerable capital and hire 
skilled producers, technicians and performers. The gramophone 
industry’s scale of investment, Maugham implied, deserved reward. He 
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did not mention the Royal Commission on Performing Rights but the 
Australian inquiry also discussed the relevance of industry investment 
to the award of legal rights.5 
Maugham evidently believed that courts and governments should be 
solicitous to those who invested in industries that produced or 
disseminated copyright material. He willingly dispensed with slogans 
about authors’ rights to proclaim something that few in public life were 
yet prepared to say – that effort and investment entitled the copyright 
industrialists to the rewards and protections of copyright legislation. 
After Cawardine, the industrialists felt no fear in announcing that they, 
as much as creators, deserved legislation that fenced out imitators and 
protected them from predation. 
After Latham 
Robert Menzies, Latham’s 39-year-old successor as the Member for 
Kooyong, also replaced Latham as Attorney General and Minister for 
Industry in October 1934. Intellectually highly gifted, Menzies applied 
his brains and energy far more to questions of industry, trade and 
international relations than copyright policy. His first significant 
participation in copyright policy affairs also seems to have been his last. 
In early 1935, Menzies met the representatives of APRA and the 
commercial radio stations to discuss their continuing dispute over 
licence fees and displayed impressive grasp of new subject matter.  
The meeting took place in Sydney on Saturday 26 January, Australia 
Day, and Menzies made clear that he was donating his time generously 
to the assembled antagonists. “I am not wishing my services on you,” 
he said, “I have plenty of other things to do”. Earlier, he said, “I am 
here in an unofficial way because the Crown is not immediately 
concerned in this thing.” Starting proceedings at 11 am and continuing 
for well over two hours, he controlled the meeting with the mixture of 
logic, intelligence, impatience and flashes of humour, that in a few years 
carried him to the Lodge.  
Menzies asked the warring parties to make peace. The public, he said, 
“have some interest in this, that is why I thought I would get you 
                                                     
5 Reginald Bonney, counsel for the associated manufacturers, stated unequivocally 
that investment leading to production deserved legal protection, and he explained 
why – investment is necessary to produce records, and the value of a record is 
evidenced not only by its purchase but the playing of it. The performance value of a 
record justified recognition of the mechanical performing right. 
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together to see whether we can evade all that sort of thing.” His efforts 
were partly successful and the parties agreed to extend the term of their 
existing agreement to the end of 1935. From the modern perspective, 
however, the future Prime Minister’s notes of the meeting are more 
revealing than the transcript of proceedings. 
Menzies had little sympathy for the commercial broadcasters. They 
paid, in total, copyright fees one tenth the size of the fees levied on the 
ABC, and still pressed for a 25 per cent discount. He wrote that they 
were “not sincere.” But he felt no more sympathy for APRA. 
“A.P.R.A.,” he noted, “is not free from blame. It is the most effective 
performing right collecting agency in the world. Its revenue is 
proportionately the greatest but it is never satisfied.” 
Menzies understood that APRA obeyed an internal law of 
engorgement: left alone, it would suck revenue from any available 
source without limit or cessation. He saw also that it fell to the 
Government to create the machinery to moderate APRA’s claims. The 
Association “should be given to understand,” he wrote in his notes, 
“that a halt must be called somewhere. The percentage increases of the 
past few years have a snowball effect and will ultimately lead to the B 
Class Stations paying as much as the highly financial A Class stations.”  
Menzies last sentence proved prophetic. “The other outstanding 
matters in dispute,” he wrote, “will never be settled until the whole of 
the Copyright Law is recast.” His notes also tacitly acknowledged that 
bargaining strength, not agreement on the intrinsic merits of copyright 
material, determined the fees extracted by copyright owners. Speaking 
of the “steps” involved in deciding fees, he declared, “I admit they are 
purely arbitrary but you have got to come to arbitrary arrangement 
some day.”  
Menzies views on performing right fees and copyright regulation 
generally are perhaps best revealed in a comment made during the 
middle of the Australia Day meeting. “You could stay here till the crack 
of doom and never work out a [valuation] formula,” he told his 
audience. Menzies was an ambitious politician in a hurry. Unlike 
Latham, he did not take an interest in the law for its own sake. In the 
handful of years before he became Prime Minister, he did not intend to 
waste time conciliating and coddling businessmen who could make 
their own bargains.  
He no doubt anticipated that as Latham predicted – correctly – the 
suppliers and users of music would reach commercial accommodations. 
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So they did. Soon enough, commercial users agreed to the terms 
offered by the suppliers of music. Self-regulation secured supply and 
delivered music to the public. For Menzies, silence in the world of 
performing rights was enough. He did not have time to consider the 
deeper questions that Latham pondered and ultimately abandoned. 
Appropriately, perhaps, Langer Owen died at home in Bellevue Hill the 
day before Menzies’ meeting a few kilometres away in Sydney. In every 
way a gentleman, he wanted to see good intentions in those who 
appeared before him. With him passed an era in which the 
Government engaged actively in copyright politics on behalf of the 
public. The new era under Menzies appeared very different.  
The Menzies years 
Policy quietism and APRA’s consolidation  
For the remainder of the decade, copyright users paid up and shut up. 
As the Owen Report vanished from memory, and after Latham 
departed to Melbourne, users calculated that their chances of effectively 
resisting the APRA-gramophone company Goliath were negligible. 
When the main advocates for the public interest departed the political 
scene, they were like David deprived of his sling. The problem was not 
that APRA and the gramophone companies invariably acted 
rapaciously or treated the commercial users unfairly. The radio 
broadcasters, the cinema exhibitors and the local government 
associations were capable of looking after themselves. But the public 
knew little about commercial transactions that imposed public costs.6  
Policy quietism entrenched the idea that the copyright owner’s 
exclusive rights are the expressions of moral necessity. Left to regulate 
themselves, the suppliers and users of music continued their arguments 
over licence fees. The suppliers soon enough forced the consent of 
users to new agreements and created in the second half of the 1930s 
the prototype of the modern copyright collecting system. They 
extracted growing revenues for the aggregate use of copyright works 
and reinforced the dominance of copyright owners over users. Revenue 
                                                     
6 Through increased radio licence fees, the imposition of higher cinema ticket 
prices, fees for using halls etc. While the B Class radio stations did not pass on 
costs, increased public performance fees meant an intangible cost for the public: to 
recoup income the commercial stations increased advertising costs and advertising 
time. 
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and more revenue became the silent catchcries of APRA and the record 
companies, although the latter were yet to demand performance levies 
from radio broadcasters. 
APRA collected fees from the source most able and willing to pay – the 
ABC – and concentrated on increasing the flow of revenue from 
secondary sources, including the B Class stations and cinemas. By 1950, 
revenue from commercial radio stations exceeded that provided by the 
ABC. The gramophone companies, emboldened by the decision in 
Cawardine, began to make noises about payment for mechanical 
performances, though for another 30 years commercial broadcasters 
refused to pay. The ABC was not so lucky. The Labor MP Rex Connor, 
said during the debate over the Copyright Bill in 1968, that the ABC 
was “mulcted of about $45,000 a year.” Connor asserted that because 
the ABC “has no right of advertising it is in the unfortunate position of 
having no bargaining power.”  
The ABC and APRA agreed new licence payments in 1934, the former 
agreeing to pay APRA £27,000 per year and 6 per cent of listeners’ fee 
income received in excess of £250,000. Within two years, APRA 
pressed for an increased rate and the ABC responded by proposing 
arbitration. After APRA, in the words of a Government Minister, 
“stonewalled”7 for two years, the parties submitted their dispute to 
arbitration by Clive Teece KC, a member of the Sydney Bar. The ABC 
agreed to pay 6d per listener’s licence, an amount totalling about 
£50,000 per annum.  
For over 15 years, however, the ABC maintained that the agreed rate 
was a provisional amount that could be reduced. Until at least the end 
of the 1950s, all letters to APRA enclosing payment ended with this 
paragraph: “We make this payment on the clear and distinct 
understanding that it shall not constitute or be deemed to constitute 
any admission of your association’s right to receive payment at this rate, 
and without prejudice of any the ABC’s rights.” 
Gramophone companies and commercial radio 
The gramophone companies benefited significantly from Menzies’ 
indifference to copyright affairs. They continued the radio ban though 
                                                     
7 Eric Harrison, Postmaster-General (United Australia Party), speaking in 
Parliament 5 June 1939. Harrison explained that the ABC was “loathe” to take part 
in another arbitration because APRA’s delaying tactics, including the threat of legal 
action, resulted in the loss of £40,000. 
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it would be over three decades before they squeezed out of the 
commercial broadcasters something they never anticipated when they 
began their: public performance fees. Common law recognition in 
Britain of the mechanical performing right galvanised the industry and 
caused it to see that even if broadcasting reduced sales, public 
performance fees might create a torrent of profits. 
Record companies and commercial radio stations thus began the slow 
march to the modern era of mutual support. By the 1960s, the 
conditions that the gramophone industry tried to impose on radio 
announcers 30 years before would have seemed bizarre to the new 
species of announcer, the disc jockey. By then, the name of the 
recording artist counted far more than the name of the recording 
company, and the companies had come to realise that in the new 
consumer culture frequent airplay meant increased sales. 
In the 1930s, however, the record companies remained suspicious. 
They continued to jealously control the supply of records and pressed 
hard on customs officials to enforce their import monopoly. The 
companies’ suspicion of broadcasters is palpable in a 1936 
memorandum from the Comptroller General of Customs to all State 
offices. The Comptroller General instructed customs officers to 
examine record consignments imported by all commercial radio 
stations. The consignments would be examined by an agent of the 
associated manufacturers and any unauthorised imports seized.  
A sullen peace 
As Menzies skipped his way to higher office, a neglectful master, sullen 
peace descended on the Australian copyright scene. The institution of a 
copyright tribunal waited another 30 years. The Government did half-
heartedly consider the possibility of legislation but it decided against the 
idea. In 1936, Menzies attended trade talks in Britain, and the Acting 
Attorney, Thomas Brennan, twice advised the Postmaster General 
about establishing the tribunal. 
Brennan considered whether the Commonwealth could amend the 
British Copyright Act (adopted as a Schedule to the Australian Act) to 
create the tribunal. He concluded that it could not. Under section 25 of 
the British Act, if a self-governing dominion (like Australia) adopted 
the Act, the Act became the law of the dominion. Section 25 permitted 
modification of the Act only in relation to procedure and remedies and 
to adapt the Act to local circumstances. To amend the Act to permit a 
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system of compulsory arbitration went beyond the modifications 
contemplated in section 25.  
The Government, said Brennan, could repeal the British Act and 
substitute new provisions, including one conferring the power to 
legislate to create a tribunal. However, this measure would “involve a 
great deal of work in preparing the Bill and piloting it through 
Parliament.” Brennan advised that any action would be “undesirable” 
before the Berne Union held its Brussels Revision Conference in 1937.8 
Yet though the Government finally abandoned any lingering intention 
to implement recommendations of the Owen Report, and the parties 
arguing over the performing right patched together working 
agreements, old resentments remained. APRA, in particular, attracted 
the animosity of politicians and possibly the public they represented.  
The end of an era – the debate over APRA  
Former Postmaster General speaks out against APRA 
On 5 June 1939, politicians from all parties furiously attacked APRA in 
the House of Representatives. The Country Party MP, and former 
Postmaster General, Archie Cameron, began the assault. Lately a 
member of the Coalition Government, now in nominal opposition 
after his party left its coalition with the UAP in April 1939, Cameron 
moved a House adjournment. He wanted to discuss a “definite matter 
of urgent public importance”, namely the powers of APRA, its place in 
Australian society, and the UAP Government’s attitude towards it. Five 
MPs supported his motion and began an emotional debate. One 
parliamentarian said Cameron had stirred up “a hornet’s nest”. Billy 
Hughes, Attorney General again at the age of 77, soberly acknowledged 
that his former colleague “raised a very important and, certainly, a 
highly complex question.” 
Cameron, perhaps partly motivated by continuing hostility between the 
Country Party and the UAP after the former’s withdrawal from the 
Government coalition two months earlier, called for the repeal of the 
Copyright Act. He wanted new legislation that permitted government 
to prescribe performing right fees and collect fees on behalf of 
                                                     
8 The Berne Union postponed the 1935 Conference. A Conference finally took 
place in 1948. 
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authors.9 The Labor Party backed him. Frank Forde, Labor Prime 
Minister for eight days in 1945, supported all proposals. He called for 
the Government to “bestir itself” and implement the recommendations 
in the Owen Report.  
Cameron’s complaints reprised themes raised by APRA’s opponents in 
the 1920s and they struck home forcefully. After the long hiatus in 
public controversy over its activities, the debate shocked APRA. It 
swiftly issued a rebuttal statement to politicians and the heads of 
relevant government departments, though its fears were probably 
unwarranted. Hughes staunchly defended APRA in the House and 
showed no inclination to legislate.  
During the April debate, Government Ministers reacted 
unenthusiastically to Cameron’s speech. But they were obviously 
shaken. Hughes struggled to defend the performing right and the 
continuing neglect of the Owen Report. Eric Harrison, the Postmaster 
General, who held portfolio responsibility for the ABC and 
broadcasting policy, agreed with Hughes about the difficulty of  
creating new copyright legislation. But he also expressed undisguised 
dislike for APRA. 
That Harrison should agree with Cameron about the iniquities of 
APRA is hardly surprising. Throughout the 1930s, the Postmaster 
General’s Department conducted a covert war against APRA, which 
departmental officers, and their political masters, considered a menace 
to effective broadcasting policy. Trying to encourage the sustainable 
national growth of a radio industry struggling for economic survival, 
they reacted with fury to APRA’s loud demands for payment of 
performance fees. Though successive Postmaster Generals worked 
with counterpart Attorneys to help resolve the disputes between APRA 
and radio broadcasters, their sympathies, far more than those of the 
Attorneys, lay with the radio stations. Sympathy for broadcasters 
translated into barely concealed hostility towards APRA.  
MPs listened favourably to Cameron’s proposals. They knew that as 
Harrison’s immediate predecessor in the position of Postmaster 
General, he dealt personally with APRA representatives during the 
1938 arbitration of the ABC-APRA dispute over performance fees. He 
could thus claim relevant knowledge and experience and, some may 
have thought, a disinterested attitude. Many politicians had another 
reason for supporting Cameron. They were deeply suspicious about the 
                                                     
9 Cameron’s proposal replicated elements of Canadian legislation passed in 1931. 
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collecting society’s social utility. They could not understand why, after 
two royal commissions, one on wireless, the second on performing 
rights, complaints about APRA persisted.  
The call for a new Act and controls on APRA 
Cameron told the House that despite recent troubles, he felt no 
hostility to the Government. Nor did he wish to harm authors. The 
law, however, failed to effectively protect authors. He presented a 
simple remedy. “The present Copyright Act,” he said, “should be 
abolished and replaced by an entirely new Act.” The Act, according to 
Cameron, was “iniquitous”. It placed no limit on APRA’s freedom to 
levy extortionate rates. As a result, APRA, “practically points a gun at 
the heads of those in charge of broadcasting as it does when dealing 
with picture shows, schools of art and others.” 
Parliament, Cameron said, passed the copyright legislation to benefit 
authors, not an organisation like APRA, that collected income for an 
“international concern which has very little interest in the development 
of music or art.”10 He did not pause to describe the “international 
concern” but his audience no doubt drew the logical inference: income 
remitted to the PRS and other performing right societies found its way 
into the pockets of foreign, mostly British, music publishers. Foreign 
beneficiaries received about 99 per cent of copyright revenue collected 
in Australia, and their returns increased year after year.  
Cameron pointed out that, broadcasters, hotels, cafes, passenger 
steamers, dance halls, districts halls and mechanics institutes paid 
steadily increasing sums to play music. While the use of music in 
cinemas had fallen by 70 per cent since the introduction of talking 
films, APRA had doubled performance fees and remained unsatisfied. 
Now hotels and cafes were liable for re-diffusion fees, paying, in other 
words for the amplification of radio broadcasts by speakers. 
In one sense, Cameron was whistling in the wind. As he wryly 
observed, “I shall be told by the Attorney General that it is difficult to 
alter the situation because Australia is a party to an international 
agreement.” But in another way, he hit the nail uncomfortably on the 
head. APRA, could, as he said, “charge anything it likes, and it does.” 
Yet for six years, UAP Governments had ignored the chief 
                                                     
10 According to Cameron, while APRA claimed to control the performing right in 
over 80 per cent of copyright music, it could probably not claim legally to hold the 
right in more than 50 per cent of cases.  
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recommendation of the Owen Report and chosen not to create a 
copyright tribunal. Cameron now called for the creation of “a legally 
constituted authority” to prescribe fees. He asked the Government also 
to emulate the Canadian practice of publishing annual lists of copyright 
fees payable by music users. 
Labor’s position 
Frank Forde, speaking after Cameron, forcefully drew attention to the 
Government’s failure to implement the Owen Report. He pointed out 
that the Royal Commission made 15 “helpful” recommendations “but, 
with two minor exceptions they have been ignored.” Forde asked for 
“definite” action to place checks on “the unbridled rapacity of this 
combine.” Unlike Cameron, he directed his ire at local publishers as 
well as foreign. He said: 
Among the persons who derive the greatest benefit from these fees are the owners of 
the most expensive private yachts on the Sydney Harbour.  
Forde declared that Labor stood squarely behind the artist and 
composer, and he called on Hughes to take action, along the lines 
suggested by Cameron: 
We stand for the protection of the rights of composers and writers; but we are 
opposed to exploitation by middlemen who are not composers, but publishers who 
have purchased Australian rights for nominal sums and are fleecing the public … 
It is useless for him [the Attorney General] to tell us that nothing can be done this 
year because of other legislation, because this is surely one of the big questions of the 
moment that calls for legislative action.  
The Government defends itself 
Hughes reacted with characteristic passion. He reminded his listeners 
that he was Attorney General when Parliament enacted the Copyright 
Act in 1912. Forgetting the criticism of the legislation by Keating and 
others in the Senate, he observed that the Act “was then considered to 
be a highly satisfactory piece of legislation”. The drafters, however, 
could not anticipate the effect of radio, gramophone and cinema on 
popular taste and the use of music. The new developments created a 
dilemma for legislators: 
The Government recognises very clearly that there is room for improvement. But it is 
not easy to protect composers, and at the same time ensure that listeners shall have 
that wide range of choice to which they are entitled at low cost. 
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Practicalities constrained the Government. According to Hughes, 
section 25 of the incorporated British Copyright Act prevented the 
Government from amending the copyright legislation so to create a 
body to fix fees would require repeal and a new Act. The  
Government was prepared to consider establishing a tribunal but the 
difficulties involved could not be ignored. Nor could the Government 
ignore the Berne Convention, which, according to Hughes, permitted 
the fixing of fees for broadcasting only, and not any other kind of 
public performance.  
Hughes reminded MPs that the purpose of an organisation like APRA 
was to achieve the end that critics sought: the effective remuneration of 
authors by the collective administration of rights. As part of the 
international family of performing right societies, APRA enabled 
Australian composers to receive income for the public performance of 
their works not only in Australia but abroad. Did the critics offer a 
better method of remuneration? “I ask honourable members,” he said, 
“how that [remuneration] is to be done except through an organization 
of this kind.”  
Reluctant support of Postmaster General 
Eric Harrison, the Postmaster General more reluctantly justified the 
Government’s policy of inaction. He told the House that he agreed 
with some of Cameron’s chief criticisms of APRA. Harrison himself 
cast doubt on the efficacy of the collective administration of rights. 
Supposition and guesswork, rather than accurate accounting, 
underpinned the collecting system. As he said to the Parliament: 
The Australasian Performing Right Association would find it difficult to establish 
in court that compositions for the public presentation of which a royalty was claimed 
was in fact broadcast by any station or stations at any given time or times. 
If APRA could not accurately determine the authorship of music 
played in public then the public could not be certain that APRA 
appropriately distributed licensing income. One thing Harrison 
considered certain. As the Attorney General pointed out, giving  
effect to suggested changes to the Copyright Act would probably  
necessitate, as a first step, repeal of the existing legislation. Any change 
affecting the interests of APRA would involve difficult negotiations. 
According to Harrison, APRA “stonewalled very successfully” during 
its protracted licensing negotiations with the ABC. It was unlikely to be 
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a productive participant in any process designed to produce new 
copyright legislation.  
Harrison made the divergence between the Government’s attitude and 
his own views plain enough to MPs. Larry Anthony, the Country Party 
Member for Richmond, summed up the general mood when he 
observed to the House: 
Although I am quite prepared to believe that the present Postmaster General is 
desirous of giving this matter fair consideration, he has to have the backing of the 
Attorney General and the Cabinet in any decision he makes, and from what we 
have heard this afternoon I am not all satisfied that he has the full degree of support 
for his opinions from the members of Cabinet which would enable him to protect the 
public against the rapacity of this international group which is exploiting it. 
Reasons for Government inaction 
The Government’s attitude grew out of the heedlessness of the 
Menzies years, when a tacit policy of non-interference by the Attorney 
General allowed APRA a free hand to pursue tactics that generated 
more resentment. In 1939 many politicians, including some in 
Government circles, considered that APRA served the interests of 
publishers, not authors. No-one could argue that its methods for 
collecting and distributing income were open to question. Few would 
say that its reluctance to disclose information did not deserve  
censure.11 The Postmaster General had himself suggested that  
APRA’s representatives had, in at least one instance, acted aggressively  
and dishonourably.  
The statements made about APRA in House of Representatives in 1939 
indicate that politicians were even more hostile to the collecting society 
at the end of the decade than the beginning. Yet the Government, now 
led by Menzies, remained unmoved by calls for action, mainly because 
it could afford not to act. Even if peace in the copyright world came on 
the terms of the suppliers of music, no-one could deny that the public 
continued to hear music played over the radio and by gramophone. No 
voters protested at the percentage of their listeners’ licence charges paid 
as performing rights fees. No-one noticeably objected to the increases 
                                                     
11 The Member for Richmond, Larry Anthony (Country Party) said: “The 
Postmaster General said that he was unable to secure the information [about 
distributions] as it was in the private possession of the Association and that the 
Association was not inclined to disclose it.” 
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to advertising time on commercial radio as stations recouped the cost 
of paying public performance fees. 
As for the composers of copyright music, for whom the politicians 
declared sympathy, they seemed happy enough with APRA’s 
distribution policy. Parliamentarians in 1939 were not. Speaker after 
speaker praised Cameron for raising the question of performing right 
fees. Many demanded information about the proportion of royalties 
collected by APRA that found their way to the pockets of artists. The 
terms “blackmail” and “exploitation” recurred, as they had done at 
done at large during the last 15 years. 
But nothing happened. Within months, war broke out and APRA 
became one of the least of the Government’s concerns. The calls for 
change and the clamour for renewal died, and copyright policy sank 
into the dreamless realms of stasis. Only the passing of a new British 
Copyright Act, more than 15 more years later, roused copyright 
policymakers from their torpor.  
  
 
